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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(k) because this is an appeal from a final decision of the District
Court. This appeal has been retained by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Questions Presented and Standards of Review

1.

Did the District Court err in entering its Order dismissing with prejudice

Chad Hudgens' ("Hudgens") Complaint and entering judgment in favor of Prosper, Inc.
("Prosper") and Joshua Christopherson ("Christopherson") (collectively referred to as the
"Prosper Defendants")?
2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by entering its Order denying

Hudgens' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint?
B.

Standards of Review

District Court's Conclusions of Law: With respect to the Order granting Prosper's
Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Hudgens' Complaint with prejudice, the trial court's
legal conclusions should be "reviewed for legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d
422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial
court's conclusions of law no deference but instead review them for correctness.");
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e
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afford no deference because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for
correctness.").
District Court's Denial of Hudgens5 Motion to Amend the Complaint: With
respect to the trial court's denial of Hudgens5 Motion to Amend the Complaint, the trial
court's Order should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Turville v. J J.
Properties, LQ 145 P.3d 1146, 1150 (UT. App. 2006).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(1) is of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below

On January 17, 2008 Hudgens filed a Verified Complaint ("Complaint") against
the Prosper Defendants and alleged as causes of action: assault and battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination and intentional interference with
contractual relations. Record on Appeal ("R.") at 0011-0004. On March 10. 2008, the
Prosper Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Hudgens' Complaint on the grounds that
all of Hudgens5 claims were barred as a matter of law under the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(1). R. at 20.
On July 23, 2008, after the Court heard oral argument on the Prosper Defendants5
Motion to Dismiss, the Court issued a ruling granting the Motion to Dismiss and
dismissed all of Hudgens5 claims as a matter of law. R. at 92. Specifically, the Court
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dismissed Hudgens' intentional tort claims without prejudice and ruled that they were
barred by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. R. 9089. The Court dismissed with prejudice Hudgens' claim for intentional interference with
contractual relations on the basis that the parties had agreed in open Court to a dismissal
of such. R. at 90. Lastly, the Court dismissed Hudgens' wrongful termination cause of
action, without prejudice, on the grounds that Hudgens failed to plead any facts sufficient
to allege a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. R. at 89-87.
B.

Disposition in the District Court

On October 7, 2008 the Court entered an Order dismissing the Hudgens'
Complaint consistent with the Ruling. R. at 112. On October 3, 2008, Hudgens filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Verified Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint"). R. at
107. The Prosper Defendants opposed the Motion and moved the trial court to dismiss
the Complaint with prejudice. On March 27, 2009 the Court denied Hudgens' Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint and dismissed Hudgens' Complaint with prejudice.
R. at 184.
C.

Statement of Facts

The facts set forth by Hudgens' Brief were not determined by the Court in any of
the proceedings below. Rather, the "facts" are simply a recitation of the allegations as set
forth in Hudgens' Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint. However, because the
procedural posture of this case was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
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Complaint, the Court accepted Hudgens' factual allegations contained therein as true for
purposes of determining the Prosper Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss. Thus, for purposes
of this appeal, Hudgens" facts as asserted in the Complaint will be deemed admitted.
However, the facts as alleged in the Proposed Amended Complaint are not admitted and.
where inconsistent or contrary to the allegations of the Complaint they should be
disregarded for purposes of reviewing the trial court's Order dismissing the Complaint.
In addition to Hudgens' Statement of Facts, the Prosper Defendants set forth the
following additional facts:
1.

On January 17, 2008 Hudgens filed a Complaint against the Prosper

Defendants and alleged as causes of action: assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, wrongful termination and intentional interference with contractual
relations. R. at 11-4.
2.

In support of Hudgens' causes of action for assault and battery and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hudgens specifically alleged that:
a the Defendants "intentionally engaged in physically and emotionally
abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the
productivity of the team." See Verified Complaint at ^f 10, R. at 10. (emphasis
added).
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b. "[Defendants] asked for volunteers for a new motivational exercise . . . In
an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to [Defendants], Hudgens
volunteered." Id. at ^f 12, R. at 9. (Emphasis added).
c. "the conduct of [Defendants] was undertaken in bad faith and was in
reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of [Hudgens]. Id.
at^25.
d. "[Defendants] intentionally utilized means of physical and emotional
intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing [Hudgens] . . . to
generate more revenue for the company." Id. at ^f 27 (emphasis added).
On March 10, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Hudgens5

3.

Verified Complaint on the grounds that all of Hudgens' claims were barred as a matter of
law. R. at 20.
4.

On July 23, 2008, after the Court heard oral argument on the Motion to

Dismiss, the Court issued a ruling granting the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed all of
Hudgens' claims as a matter of law. R. at 92. Specifically, the Court dismissed
Hudgens' intentional tort claims without prejudice and ruled that they were barred by the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. R. 90-89. The Court
dismissed with prejudice Hudgens' claim for intentional interference with contractual
relations on the basis that the parties had agreed in open Court to a dismissal of such. R.
at 90. Lastly, the Court dismissed Hudgens' wrongful termination cause of action,
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without prejudice, on the grounds that Hudgens failed to plead any facts sufficient to
allege a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. R. at 89-87. A copy of the
Court's Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.
5.

On October 7, 2008 the Court entered an Order dismissing the Hudgens'

Complaint consistent with the Ruling. R. at 112. A copy of the Order is attached hereto
as Addendum Exhibit B.
6.

On October 3, 200 85 Hudgens filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint. R. at 107. The Prosper Defendants opposed the Motion and moved the trial
court to amend the earlier Order of dismissal and dismiss all Hudgens' claims with
prejudice. R. at 164.
7.

On March 275 2009 the Court denied Hudgens' Motion for Leave to File an

Amended Complaint and dismissed Hudgens5 Complaint with prejudice. R. at 184.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
According to Hudgens, the Prosper Defendants are liable on several causes of
action relating to Hudgens' employment at Prosper and his subsequent resignation.
However, Hudgens' intentional tort causes of action cannot be brought because they are
prohibited under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision.
This is so because Hudgens failed to plead that the Prosper Defendants had a deliberate
and conscious intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury on Hudgens. This Court
has recently held that in order to overcome the exclusive remedy provision of the Act an
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employer must have actual knowledge of a dangerous condition after which the employer
still requires a specific employee to perform a specific task. Accordingly, this Court
should affirm the dismissal of Hudgens' intentional tort claims with prejudice, pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Further, the dismissal of Hudgens' wrongful termination claim must be affirmed
because Hudgens has failed to allege facts demonstrating that he was terminated for
reasons that contravene a clear and substantial public policy. As such, this Court should
affirm the dismissal of Hudgens' wrongful termination claim with prejudice, pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Finally, Hudgens' Motion to Amend was properly denied by the trial court.
Hudgens admitted, under oath, that the purpose of the Prosper Defendants' conduct was
not to injure but to motivate. Because Hudgens had made these admissions under oath,
the trial court properly denied Hudgens5 request to contradict his earlier sworn
statements. The trial court also properly denied Hudgens' Motion to Amend his wrongful
termination cause of action because he completely failed to articulate and allege any facts
demonstrating that he was terminated for reasons that contravene a clear and substantial
public policy.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING HUDGENS'
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED,
A.

Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the trial court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and indulge all
reasonable inferences in its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055,
1058 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party "fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved," and if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim, then the plaintiff
has failed to state a claim. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 467
P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1970). A motion to dismiss is properly granted in cases in which
"even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they provide no legal basis
for recovery." Mackeyv. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Utah App. 2000).
Finally, with respect to the issue in this case that Hudgens5 claims are barred by
the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, "a complaint, to
survive a motion to dismiss, must do more than merely allege intentional injury as an
exception to the general exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate
intent to bring about injury." Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940
(Utah App. 1989). (Emphasis added).
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In the present case, the trial court's Order should be affirmed that even if the
factual assertions in Hudgens5 Complaint are deemed true, they nevertheless provide
Hudgens no legal basis for recovery because they are barred by the exclusive remedy
provision.
B.

Hudgens9 Intentional Tort Claims Are Barred as a Matter of Law by
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision.

The Utah Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"), U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(l), provides a
comprehensive bar against any action at law brought by an injured employee:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . .. and no action at
law may be maintained against an employer or against any other officer,
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or
death of an employee.
(emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the exclusive remedy provision
of the Act bars common-law tort actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury.
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corporation, 16 P.3d 555, 560-561 (Utah 2000). See also
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1991).
In Shattuck, the Supreme Court stated:
The workers' compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo between
employers and employees. Under the Act's balancing of rights, employees
are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault and
9

employers are protected from tort suits by employees by virtue of the Act's
exclusive remedy provision.. . It is well settled that the Act covers . . .
mental and physical injuries sustained on the job. Accordingly, we have
held that the exclusive remedy provision bars common-law tort actions
requiring proof of physical or mental injury.
ShattuckdX 560-561 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
However, despite the absolute language of § 105(1) over the years Utah courts
have recognized a very narrow exception to the Act's exclusivity provision for mental
and physical injuries sustained by an employee. In Lantz v. National Semiconductor
Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals carefully defined the
limited scope of the exception under which a common-law tort action for injury can be
maintained against an employer or its employees. The Court adopted the almost
nationally uniform standard that the narrow exception applies only when an employee
demonstrates an employer's "conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of
inflicting injury." Id. at 939 (citingHildebrandt v. Wliirlpool Corp., 364N.W.2d 394,
396 (Minn. 1985)). In adopting the above standard, the Lantz Court rejected the
"substantial certainty standard" which is a recognized standard in the area of common tort
law. Id.
The Lantz Court held that liability under the foregoing exception to the Act's
exclusive remedy provision:
[c]annot5 under the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to include
accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, willful deliberate,
intentional reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute or
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other misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent
directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. (Emphasis added).
Lantz at 939-940 {citing 2A A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 68.13
(1988)). The Lantz Court stated that "a complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, must
do more than merely allege intentional injury as an exception to the general exclusiveness
rule; it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about injury." Id. at
940. (Emphasis added).
In Utah, the Act's exclusive remedy provision has been consistently applied in
harmony with the Lantz analysis. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's order
dismissing an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., supra, the court addressed a situation in which an
employee brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his
employer for certain alleged conduct by a co-worker. The court analyzed the claim in
light of the Act's exclusive remedy provision, under which employers are immune from
any and all civil liability arising out of an employee's physical or mental harm sustained
during his employment, and ruled that such a claim is barred by the Act. Id. at 1058;
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(l). In so ruling, the court stated that if the action for damages for
infliction of emotional distress is to recover for injury, the action is therefore barred by
the Act. Id at 1058.
Recently, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act was again addressed in Helfv.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009). In Helf9 this Court was concerned with
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a trial courts' application of the legal concept of "intent" as it pertained to defining
conduct under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. The Court reaffirmed the
holdings of Lantz and Mounteer and further clarified how courts should analyze and
apply the "intent to injure standard." The Helf Court reiterated that intentional injuries
"which fall within the intentional injury exception, and negligent or accidental injuries,
which are covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act." Id. at 970.
The Court then engaged in a careful and complicated analysis of the "intent to
injure" standard by distinguishing between the legal concept of intent and motive or
desire. In so doing, the Court held that intent as opposed to motive, "is an intent to bring
about a result which will invade the interest of another in a way that the law forbids."
Helf, at 972. Ultimately, the Helf Court held that the intent to injure must focus first on
whether the action which results in an injury was intentional and if so, focus on the
actor's knowledge, i.e., whether the actor "knew" the specific injury would occur or that
it was "virtually certain" to occur. Id. at 974. The Court also distinguished "intent" from
"probability." On this point, the Court agreed with the South Dakota Supreme Court's
holding that:
More than knowledge or appreciation of risk is required to establish
intentional conduct. The known danger must cease to become only a
foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid
(ordinary negligence) and become a substantial certainty.
Id at 974, citing Fryer v. Kranz, 616 N.W.2d 102, 106 (S.D. 2000).
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The Court held that an injury is unintentional, and barred by the Act, when it is
"not a matter of when the injury would happen (a certainty). . . [but] if it would happen
(a probability.)" Id. The Court adopted South Dakota's jurisprudence and held that in
order to demonstrate an intentional injury and satisfy the "intent to injure" standard, a
plaintiff must show that "the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition
and that the employer still required the employee to perform." Id. (emphasis added). As
this Court explained, this "approach maintains the distinction between intent and
probability by focusing on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur to
a particular employee performing a specific task in determining whether an injury was
intentional." Id. Finally, the Court held:
that the intent to injure standard requires a specific mental state in which
the actor knew or expected that injury would be the consequence of his
actions . . . In other words, the employer must know or expect that a
specific employee will be injured doing a specific task.
Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
Thus, after Helf, a plaintiff must have a "conscious and deliberate intent directed
to the purpose of inflicting injury" and this "intent" is defined as an "actual knowledge of
the dangerous condition" after which the "employer still requires a specific employee to
perform a specific task." See Lantz, Helf, generally. This concept obviously includes the
requirement that the resulting injury was the very injury that was intended by the
employer. In this case, Hudgens alleges that the injury be sustained and for which he
seeks damages was not the transitory discomfort that he alleges to have experienced
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during the motivational exercise, it was the "symptoms of sleeplessness, anxiety and
depression" for which he has received psychological counseling and has suffered
physical and emotional harm." See Verified Complaint,ffl[19-20, R. at 8.
Here, Hudgens correctly cites Helfs ultimate holding that in order to satisfy the
"intent to injure" standard, "the employer must know or expect that a specific employee
will be injured doing a specific task." See Brief at 12; He If at 91 A. This holding is
consistent with Lantz and Utah law which the trial court applied in dismissing Hudgens'
Complaint. However, Hudgens attempts to seize on Helfs dicta to overcome the fatal
deficiencies of his Complaint. Specifically, Hudgens cites Helfs discussion that an
intentional injury may arise even when the employer's motive was to increase profits, and
not to inflict injury. See Brief at p. 15; HelfdX 972. However, this language is
inapplicable to this case because Hudgens' Complaint specifically alleges that the intent
and purpose of the exercise was "to motivate" and not to injure. See Complaint; R. at
0011; Ruling at p. 4; R. at 0089. This allegation does not speak to motive, it speaks to
intent and knowledge or belief of the actor. Christopherson believed that the
motivational exercise would create a motivational state of mind in Hudgens, that it would
inspire him. There is no allegation in the Complaint as to Christopherson's knowledge or
belief, except that Christopherson is alleged to have believed the experience would result
in a motivational feeling in Hudgens. This is a far cry from intent to cause the injuries
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Hudgens alleges to have suffered. Thus, Hudgens' own sworn admissions specifically
bar his claims under the exclusive remedy provision.
In this case, the trial court dismissed Hudgens5 intentional tort claims because "the
allegations contained in the complaint are not sufficient to support a claim that the
defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff." See Ruling, R. at
0089. Although the trial court did not engage in the Helf intent vs. motive analysis, it
reached the correct conclusion. The trial court specifically found that:
The complaint contains no facts showing that Christopherson took his
actions based on a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff.
Indeed, plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's
abusive and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to
injure plaintiff
See Ruling, R. at 0089. (Emphasis added).
As the trial court found, Hudgens' Complaint failed to allege any facts to satisfy
the "intent to injure" standard and support a claim that "[the Prosper Defendants] had
actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the [they] still required [Hudgens]
to perform." Rather, Hudgens, under oath, specifically alleged that he volunteered for the
exercise and that the acts complained of were intentionally done, or were "undertaken in
bad faith and . . . in reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights" of
Hudgens. See Complaint, UH 25, 27; R. at 7. Hudgens further alleged that the intent of
the acts complained of were "for the express purpose of causing Hudgens and others to
generate more revenue for the company" and in an "attempt to improve [Hudgens'] sales

15

performance and therefore the sales performance of Christopherson's team and the
revenue of the company", not to injure Hudgens. Id.; see also Ruling.
Notably, the conduct asserted by Hudgens in this case is specifically identified in
Lantz as being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act (i.e., that the
Defendants' actions were undertaken in "bad faith and .. . reckless disregard of and
wanton indifference towards the rights" of Hudgens). See Complaint, fl 25, 27; R. at
0011. Under Lantz, injuries caused by reckless disregard and/or wanton indifference
cannot be maintained and must be dismissed.
Moreover, because Hudgens volunteered for the exercise, it cannot be argued that
he was "required" to perform the activity which caused the injury.1 Helf at 974 (quoting
Fryer v. Kranz, 616 N.W. 2d 102, 106). As set forth above, in order for conduct to be
exempt from the exclusive remedy provision, Helf requires that an employer must know
of the danger and still require the employee to perform. Helf at 91 A. Indeed, because of
the voluntary nature of Hudgens' participation in the exercise there can be no "intent to
injure" on the Prosper Defendants' part. Thus, there can be no "invasion of [Hudgens']
interests in a way that the law forbids." Id. at 972. And Hudgens' voluntary conduct
precludes the application of the exception to the exclusive remedy provision.
1

Moreover, simply because Hudgens inserts the inflammatory term "water boarding" for
shock value, Hudgens is not somehow automatically relieved from the burden to plead
facts sufficient to demonstrate that the Prosper Defendants had a "conscious and
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury." Indeed, Hudgens' use of the
term in the Complaint has no meaning at all. Whether or not the sales team leader's
judgment could be questioned, Hudgens' use of the term "water boarding" does not add
any factual basis to satisfy the pleading standard.
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Therefore, because Hudgens' Verified Complaint fails to meet the "intent to
injure" standard adopted under Helf requiring a plaintiff to allege and demonstrate that
"the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the employer
still required the employee to perform", the trial court's Order dismissing Hudgens5
intentional tort claims with prejudice must be affirmed. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
C.

Hudgens' Complaint Fails To State a Claim for Wrongful
Termination.

Utah courts have held that the rule regarding the employer-employee relationship
is that the relationship is terminable at the will of either party subject to a very few
narrow exceptions. Hancockv. Luke, 173 P. 137 (Utah 1918); Held v. American Linen
Supply Co., 307 P.2d 210 (Utah 1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354
P.2d 559 (Utah 1960); Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986)
(recognizing narrow exceptions to the at-will rule by federal and state legislation).
The law in Utah is settled that when an employee is not hired for a specified
period of time, the law presumes that either the employer or the employee may terminate
the employment relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all. Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). As such, the employer is not liable to
the employee for terminating the employment relationship and the employer's decision to
terminate an employee is presumed to be legal and valid. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812
P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1991); Touchardv. LA-Z-BOY, INC, 148 P.3d 945, 948 (Utah 2006).
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A discharged employee can overcome the at-will presumption only by showing
one of three narrow exceptions recognized by Utah law: (1) there is an implied or express
agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of
some agree-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment
constitutes a violation of clear and substantial public policy. Touchard at 948.
Hudgens' Complaint alleges no facts to support a claim for wrongful discharge.
First, the Complaint contains no facts alleging that Hudgens had an implied or express
contract with Prosper. Second, the Complaint neither cites nor alleges thai the Hudgens
was terminated in violation of a state or federal statute. Third, the Complaint fails to
allege facts that Hudgens was terminated for reasons that contravene a clear and
substantial public policy. See Ruling, R. at 0089. Although no facts were alleged to
support a claim of wrongful discharge, Hudgens argued that the public policy exception
was sufficiently implicated to survive a motion to dismiss.
To be clear, the Complaint does not assert that Hudgens was terminated in
violation of a recognized public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption.
However, even if Hudgens had alleged such, the claim would fail as a matter of law. In
order to make out a prima facie case for wrongful discharge based on the public policy
exception, a plaintiff must plead and establish facts to support each of the following
elements: (1) that his employer terminated him; (2) that a clear and substantial public
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policy existed; (3) that the employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and (4) that
the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Ryan
v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an employee has a cause of action under
the public policy exception if his or her termination violated a clear and substantial public
policy. Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950 (Utah 2004). However, the Court has
defined only four categories that invoke a clear and substantial public policy: (1)
discharging an employee for refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act; (2)
discharging an employee for performing a public obligation; (3) discharging an employee
for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) discharging an employee for reporting an
employer's criminal activities to the appropriate authorities. Ryan at 408; Touchard at
948-949. Hudgens' complaint does not attempt to identify any violation of public policy,
let alone identify a specific category of public policy recognized in Utah.
Here, the dismissal of Hudgens' claim for wrongful termination must be affirmed
because Hudgens has not demonstrated that (1) he was terminated; (2) that a clear and
substantial public policy existed; (3) that Hudgens' conduct brought the policy into play;
and (4) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are causally
connected. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998).
First, the Complaint fails to allege that Prosper terminated Hudgens' employment.
Rather, Hudgens admits he resigned but contends that he was constructively terminated.
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{See Complaint, 1JU 29-30). R. at 0011. However, to the extent Hudgens claims he was
constructively discharged, the Complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts to support such
a claim. Although the Utah Supreme Court has said that a resignation under working
conditions that a reasonable employee would consider intolerable is equivalent to a
termination (Touchard at 954), Hudgens has failed to set forth any facts to meet this
standard. Merely asserting "constructive discharge" in substitution of an actual firing
does not modify the underlying analysis of a wrongful termination claim. As such,
Hudgens must still plead facts sufficient to establish an exception to the at-will
relationship in order to make out a cause of action for wrongful discharge or termination.
M a t 954-955
Next, Hudgens' Complaint completely fails to set forth any facts to support his
claim that a clear and substantial public policy existed, that Hudgens5 conduct brought
the public policy into play, and that the discharge and any conduct bringing the policy
into play are causally connected. Dan's Food Stores, Inc. at 404. In fact, the first time
Hudgens alleged he was discharged in violation of a clear and substantial public policy
was in his Opposition to Prosper's Motion to Dismiss, not in the Complaint. R. at 69.
Hudgens5 argument that his "constructive termination violated a clear and
substantial public policy interest under Utah law" (Brief at 17), is not supported by any of
the only four recognized public policies under Utah Law. Instead, Hudgens argues that
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the violated public policy was "the public policy underlying the numerous statutory and
common law protections and penalties regarding the physical and emotional integrity of
Utah Citizens.5'2 Id. at 17-18. Hudgens cites Utah's "Hazing" statute to support this
novel and unrecognized public policy as an exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
However, this suggested public policy is not recognized as such by this Court.
Indeed, Hudgens has ignored the only four categories which invoke a clear and
substantial public policy: (1) discharging an employee for refusing to commit an illegal
or wrongful act; (2) discharging an employee for performing a public obligation; (3)
discharging an employee for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) discharging an
employee for reporting an employer's criminal activities to the appropriate authorities.
Ryan at 408; Touchard at 948-949. Thus, Hudgens' newly created public policy
"regarding the physical and emotional integrity of Utah Citizens" does not exist under
this Court's established case law and must be denied.
Finally, Hudgens goes so far as to argue that he was terminated for "refusing to
commit an unlawful act." See Appellant's Brief at p. 21. 3 The weakness of this
argument is readily apparent as there are no facts pled in the Complaint to support a claim
2

Were Hudgens' articulated public policy to be adopted by the Court, the variations on
what could constitute an affront to "the physical and emotional integrity" of a Utah
Citizen would be endless and completely beyond any court's ability to set boundaries
around the policy. It would be utterly unmanageable as a judicial exercise and
completely unreasonable to elaborate such to a public policy category.
Again, this allegation was raised for the first time in Hudgens' Opposition to Prosper's
Motion to Dismiss.
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that (1) Hudgens was requested to perform an illegal act, (2) that Hudgens refused to
commit an illegal act, and (3) that Prosper terminated Hudgens for refusing to commit
said act.
Hudgens also argues that he was terminated because he refused "to work in an
environment in which his employer behaved in an unlawful manner towards him." See
Brief at 21. However, Hudgens confuses the "unlawful act" public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine. In order to properly invoke a clear and substantial
public policy, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the employer discharged the
employee for his refusal to commit an illegal or wrongful act. Ryan at 408. Even after
recreating his story and facts, Hudgens has failed to identify any illegal act which he
refused to perform as required by Ryan. Rather, Hudgens alleges that the illegal act was
supposedly working in a hostile work environment. This is not an illegal act and does not
satisfy the exception as set forth in Ryan and Touchard.
Finally, even if Hudgens had alleged that his constructive termination violated a
recognized public policy exception, Hudgens completely fails to demonstrate how his
conduct brought the alleged public policy into play and how the discharge and the
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Ryan v. Dan ;s Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). On this point the trial court found that Hudgens
failed to demonstrate how " [Hudgens5] conduct brought the policy of the hazing statute
into play . . ." See Ruling; R. at 0087. And "the connection between the policy
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embodied in the hazing statute and the other statutes cited by plaintiff and the conduct in
question here is far too tenuous to comport with the repeated statements of the Utah
Supreme Court emphasizing the narrowness of the public policy exception." Id.
Therefore, because Hudgens has not pled any facts whatsoever to allege a
violation of any recognized category of public policy and has not pled any facts to
support a claim that Prosper discharged Hudgens for refusing to commit an illegal act, the
trial court's order dismissing the wrongful termination claim must be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING HUDGENS5 MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE NEWLY CREATED FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH HUDGENS5 PRIOR SWORN ADMISSIONS AND
HIS CLAIMS NONETHELESS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Hudgens Should not be Allowed to Amend his Intentional Tort Claims
Because His Prior Sworn Admissions Demonstrate that these Claims
Are Barred By the Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy
Provision.

The trial court's denial of Hudgens5 Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint should be affirmed because the newly modified allegations contained therein
expressly contradict Hudgens' prior sworn admissions regarding Defendant's express
intent and purpose of the exercise and/or conduct allegedly causing the injury. Hudgens'
Verified Complaint alleged under oath that the Prosper Defendants "intentionally
engaged in physically and emotionally abusive and intimidating conduct for the express
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purpose of increasing the productivity of the team." See Verified Complaint at \ 10; R. at
0011 (emphasis added).
Hudgens also alleged that following the motivational exercise, "Christopherson
told the team that he wanted them to work as hard on making sales as Chad had worked
to breathe55 during the exercise. Id. at 17. This allegation describes Christopherson's
state of mind and expectation behind his act. Christopherson intended Hudgens "work
hard to breathe55 expecting that the degree of difficulty working to breathe would be
comparable to the degree of difficulty that a motivated employee would engage in to sell
the products of the company. Certainly, this allegation precludes an allegation or finding
that Christopherson "knew55 or expected with certainty that Hudgens would suffer
psychological trauma, sleeplessness, anxiety, stomach pain or depression. See Complaint
atffi[19-20,R.at8.
Further, Hudgens previously alleged and admitted that "the conduct of [the
Defendants] was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless disregard of and wanton
indifference towards the rights of [Plaintiff]. Id. at ^ 25 (emphasis added). Hudgens also
made the sworn admission that the "[defendants] intentionally utilized means of physical
and emotional intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing [Plaintiff] .. .
to generate more revenue for the company55 and in an "attempt to improve [Plaintiffs]
sales performance and therefore the sales performance of Christopherson5 s team and the
revenue of the company.55 Id. at ^j 27-28 (emphasis added). Finally, Hudgens admitted
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that Christopherson told the team members that the reason for the exercise was so that the
team members would "work as hard on making sales as [Plaintiff] had worked to breath .
. ." Id. at ^ 17 (emphasis added). On this point the trial court found that Hudgens
asserted "the express purpose of Christopherson's abusive and intimidating conduct was
to motivate team members, not to injure [Hudgens]." See Ruling, R. at 0089.
In Utah, "a verified pleading that meets the requirements for affidavits can be
considered a sworn statement."' Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122 n. 1 (Utah
1986); see Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985) (stating that "[a]
verified pleading, made under oath and meeting the requirements [of Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e)], can be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for
summary judgment"). Also, Utah courts require that parties attempting to contradict
prior sworn statements "adequately explain [the] contradiction." Brinton v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998).4
In Brinton, the Utah Supreme Court approved the district court's decision not to
allow a party that had submitted an affidavit in support of a motion for summary
judgment to contradict a prior sworn statement. The Court noted that the district court
"correctly held that[,] 'for purposes of the parties' motions for summary judgment, Dr.
4

Although the Brinton case dealt with the contradiction of a sworn statement in the
context of a motion for summary judgment, the analysis is equally applicable to the
present circumstances. See 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 538 (stating that, although a
motion to dismiss and a motion on the pleadings are distinct, the analysis is not
significantly different, as both require an analysis of the facts as pleaded).
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Brinson's affidavit, as a matter of law, cannot contradict his prior sworn statement.5" Id.
(quoting district court's order). The Court stated that contradiction is allowed only if the
contradiction is "adequately explained" in the subsequent pleading. Id. (citing Webster v.
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)). This principle applies to original verified
pleadings. See 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §792 (stating that "[a]n admission in an
original verified pleading will remain binding as a judicial admission even after the filing
of an amended pleading which supersedes the original.") (Emphasis added).
Here, Hudgens5 Verified Complaint is a sworn statement. Hudgens cannot object
to its use as a sworn statement at this point, as any objections to its evidentiary value in
the case have been waived. See Pentecost. Moreover, Hudgens has not provided any
explanation for the discrepancy between the original Verified Complaint and his
proposed Amended Complaint, and there are no circumstances in this case that would
justify such a substantial discrepancy in pleading Hudgens' theory of the case. The only
explanation for the substantial discrepancies that exist in the two pleadings is that
Hudgens has modified his factual allegations for the expediency of stating allegations that
conform with the legal requirements of the claims. This reason is legally unacceptable.
Therefore, the original Verified Complaint's factual allegations are binding on Hudgens.
The trial court dismissed Hudgens' intentional tort claims as a matter of law,
because, inter alia, the "Plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's
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abusive and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to injure plaintiff."
See Ruling at p. 4 (emphasis added).
The trial court's analysis of Christopherson's "purpose" in performing the
motivational exercise does not conflict with this Court's analysis of the actors "specific
mental state" and his knowledge that the injury was the desired consequence of his
action. Helf, at 974. Indeed, purpose - as opposed to motive - addresses the actor's state
of mind concerning his expectation of what would result from the intentional conduct. In
Lantz, which was affirmed by the Helf court, the Court of Appeals held that the
intentional injury exception applied "in situations characterized by 'a conscious and
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury." Lantz, 775 P.2d at 940.
Similarly, in this case, the trial court read the Complaint to allege that Christopherson's
purpose was not to inflict injury.
Accordingly, because Hudgens has admitted in his Verified Complaint that the
purpose of the exercise wras not to injure but to motivate, Hudgens' tort claims cannot
overcome the immunity granted to employers by the Worker's Compensation Act's
Exclusive Remedy Provision. See Ruling at 4. This legal deficiency remains true even
after Hudgens has attempted to contradict his earlier admissions made under oath by the
filing of the Proposed Amended Complaint.
Indeed, contradicting his prior sworn admissions that Prosper's conduct was
undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards
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the rights of Hudgens, Hudgens now alleges that Prosper "had a conscious and deliberate
intent to injure [Plaintiff] by use of waterboarding.55 See Proposed Amended Complaint
at ^f 17; R. at 102. However, and fatal to his claims, Hudgens continues to allege, even in
the Proposed Amended Complaint, that Prosper5 s "physically and emotionctlly abusive . .
. conduct [was] for the express purpose of increasing the productivity of the team." Id. at
10 (emphasis added).
As noted above, Hudgens5 Proposed Amended Complaint does not attempt to
explain or withdraw Hudgens5 prior admission that the reason for the exercise was so that
the team members would work as hard on sales as Hudgens worked to breath. See
Verified Complaint at Tf 17. Importantly, Hudgens5 Verified admission, which
demonstrates the purpose for the exercise, is binding on him regarding the Prosper
Defendants5 intent.
Moreover, Hudgens5 insertion of the buzz words "conscious and deliberate intent
to injure55 may indicate an effort to promote the form of the allegation over the
substantive facts in order to conform with the form of the legal standard, but it does not
provide a sufficient basis on which Hudgens5 may amend his Verified Complaint or to
overcome the court's Ruling, especially where the trial court previously found that
Hudgens, under oath, admitted that the intent of the exercise was to motivate, not to
injure. It is contrary to the law and the trial court's express findings to allow Hudgens to
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change his sworn testimony, as to the factual purpose of Prosper's actions, in order to
create a new theory of his case by the use of conclusory allegations.
Therefore, because Hudgens has admitted under oath that the Prosper Defendants'
purpose and intent in conducting the alleged exercise was to provide a motivational
exercise, such admissions are binding and cannot now be retracted and superseded by
amended allegations. Therefore, the trial court's Order denying Hudgens' Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint should be affirmed because the intentional tort claims
are barred by the Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision.
This Court's review of the trial court's denial of Hudgens' Motion to Amend must
be conducted on an abuse of discretion standard. Given the trial court's analysis and the
allegations of the Verified Complaint, a determination that the trial court abused its
discretion cannot be made or justified.
B.

Hudgens9 Wrongful Termination Claim Fails to Articulate a Clear and
Substantial Public Policy and Therefore Must Not be Allowed.

The trial court's Order denying Hudgens' Motion for Leave to Amend his
wrongful termination claim should be affirmed. The trial court, in great detail, addressed
Hudgens' fatal pleading deficiencies in his wrongful termination cause of action when it
granted the Prosper Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court specifically held that in
Utah the employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will and in order to
overcome this presumption a party must show that his case falls within one of three
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categories: (1) that an express or implied agreement exists, (2) that a statute or regulation
restricts the right of an employer to terminate the employee under certain conditions or
(3) that the termination constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy.
(See Ruling at 4-5; R. at 0089).
The Court ruled that Hudgens had pled no facts in the Complaint alleging that any
of these categories were applicable. However, in his Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, Hudgens raised for the first time and argued that his "constructive
termination" was wrongful because the termination violated a public policy. In response
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Hudgens was permitted to fully argue any theory of
public policy he felt was applicable to the circumstances of his termination of
employment. However, the Court dismissed Hudgens's arguments because Hudgens was
unable to articulate a recognized public policy that was violated by Hudgens's alleged
constructive termination. Id. at 6.
Hudgens's proposed Amended Complaint does nothing to improve upon the
deficiency of his original Verified Complaint. Hudgens now alleges that he was
terminated in violation of "a public policy in Utah regarding the physical and emotional
integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the workplace." (See Verified Amended
Complaint at 30). Brief at 23. However, despite the general and vague reference to such
an insubstantial and gossamer notion of "physical and emotional integrity" as a purported
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public policy5 Hudgens fails to cite to any statute, case or other law stating that this is a
recognized clear and substantial public policy which is considered sufficient to overcome
the at-will employment presumption. Moreover, Hudgens fails to allege, as an essential
element, that "[Hudgens'] conduct brought the public policy into play" and that Hudgens'
conduct and the termination are causally connected. Rather, Hudgens only makes the
bald and conclusory allegation that he was terminated, that there is an unspecified public
policy "regarding" the physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens in the workplace
and that the public policy is connected to Hudgens's termination. See Verified Amended
Complaint at 30-31. Brief at 23-24. However, Hudgens has completely failed to allege
any facts demonstrating how Hudgens' conduct brought the policy into play or what, in
fact, is the recognized clear and substantial public policy connected to the termination.
Indeed, the proposed Amended Complaint completely fails to allege any facts
demonstrating that Hudgens' "alleged termination" fits into one of the only four
categories of public policy recognized by Utah law sufficient to overcome the at-will
presumption. Simply put, Hudgens cannot articulate any facts demonstrating that his
alleged termination violated any of the four categories that invoke a clear and substantial
public policy, and there is no evidence that would support such an allegation if it had
been made.
Therefore, because Hudgens has not pled any facts whatsoever to allege a
violation of any recognized category of public policy, he cannot support a claim for
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wrongful termination based on the public policy exception to the at-will presumption of
the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, Hudgens's Motion to Amend his
wrongful termination cause of action must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Prosper and Christopherson respectfully request that
Hudgens' Appeal be denied and the trial Court's order dismissing the Complaint with
prejudice be affirmed.
DATED this

ay of December, 2009.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ

Evan A. Schmutz
Andy V. Wright
Attorneys for Appellees
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STATE OP UTAH
UTAH CO'JWTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING

CHAD HUDGENS,
Plaintiff,

Date: July 23, 2008
vs.
Case No.: 080400249
PROSPER, INC., and JOSHUA
CHRISTOPHERSON,

Judge: Gaiy D. Stott

Defendants.

On March 11, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in response to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on April
9, 2008, and Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on April 21, 2008. The court heard oral
arguments on July 14, 2008, and now issues this ruling.

BACKGROUND
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Monnteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). In that light, the court sets forth the facts of the case.
Plaintiff Chad Hudgens ("Plaintiff) worked for defendant Prosper, Inc. ("Prosper"), as a
member of the team supervised by defendant Joshua Christopherson ("Christopherson").
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Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients and Christopherson
was one of Prosper's top income producers. Prosper and Christopherson engaged in physically
and emotionally abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the
productivity of the team. This conduct included Christopherson patrolling the area with a large
wooden paddle which he hit on tables and desks close to team members and removing chairs and
drawing mustaches on team members that did not meet sales goals.
In May of 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new motivational exercise
without revealing the nature of the exercise. Plaintiff volunteered as a result of ChristophersoiVs
appeal to the loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson took the team
outside to the top of a nearby hill, where he ordered Plaintiff to lie down with his head facing
downhill. Christopherson instructed other team members to hold Plaintiff by the arms and legs
while Christopherson slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Plaintiffs mouth and nose,
making it impossible for Plaintiff to breathe for a period of time. As Plaintiff was struggling,
resisting and attempting to escape, Christopherson directed other team members to hold Plaintiff
down. After this demonstration, Christopherson told the team that he wanted them to work as
hard on making sales as Plaintiff had worked to breathe during the exercise.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff reported the incident to an employee in Prosper's human
resources department. Prosper took no action, including action against Christopherson. until
after Plaintiff left Prosper. After this incident, Plaintiff began to experience symptoms of
sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and was no
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longer able to work at Prosper. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff has required psychological
counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm.
DISCUSSION
I Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
Based upon the stipulation of the parties on the record, the court grants the Motion to
Dismiss with respect to the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. Counsel
for Plaintiff did not object to the dismissal of this claim. According to Utah case law, the
defendant in a case for intentional interference with contractual relations must be a third party to
the contract. The court concludes, and the parties agree, that Christopherson was not a third
party to the contract between Plaintiff and Prosper. Therefore, the claim for intentional
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice.
II Assault and Battery and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the causes of action for assault
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Section 34A-2-105(l) of the Utah
Code states that the remedy provided in the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy
of an employee who is injured or killed in the course of his employment. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-105(l) (2008). As acknowledged by both parties, the Utah Supreme Court has created a
narrow exception to the exclusiveness of the Workers' Compensation Act for those injuries that
occur as a result of a conscious and deliberate intent on the part of the employer or its agent to
inflict an injury upon the employee. Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (1975); see also lantz v.
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Nat'I Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989). InLantz, the Utah Court of
Appeals explained that in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it "must allege
facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about injury.'5 Id. at 940 fn. 5 (quoting 2A A.
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 68.14 at 13-46 (1988) (emphasis in original)).
The allegations contained in the complaint are not sufficient to support a claim that the
defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff From the court's perspective,
Christopherson undoubtedly exhibited poor judgment to take the actions that led to this case.
However, the purpose of those actions was to use plaintiff as an example of maximum effort for
the rest of the employees to emulate as they did work for the company. The complaint contains
no facts showing that Christopherson took his actions based on a conscious and deliberate intent
to injure plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's abusive
and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to injure plaintiff Therefore, the
claims for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed
exclusively by the Workers' Compensation Act and section 34A-2-105(l), and the Motion to
Dismiss is granted with respect to the claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Ill

Wrongful Termination
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss the claim for wrongful termination. In Utah, the

employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will, and a plaintiff must show that his case
falls within one of three categories to overcome this presumption: u (l) there is an implied or
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express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of
some agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the tennination of employment
constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy." Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.,
2006 UT 71, P3 (citations omitted). Defendants argued, and Plaintiff conceded, that the first two
categories are clearly not applicable. Therefore, the only category that is potentially applicable
is termination in violation of public policy.
In Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court
set forth the following elements to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy: "an employee must show (i) that his employer terminated him; (ii)
that a clear and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct brought the
policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are
causally connected." Id. at 404 (citations omitted). The court further emphasized the
narrowness of the public policy exception and explained that the public policy at issue is clear
and substantial "only if plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or
judicial decisions." Id. at 405.
As Defendants have argued, Plaintiffs complaint does not even address elements (ii)
through (iv) of the prima facie case for wrongful tennination set forth in Ryan. However, in his
Opposition and at the oral arguments, counsel for Plaintiff argued that there is public policy
against this type of conduct which is made clear and substantial by the enactment of the statute
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in the Utah Criminal Code prohibiting hazing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (2008). While
Plaintiffs reliance on the hazing statute is interesting, it fails to show how Plaintiffs conduct
brought the policy of the hazing statute into play, especially since the conduct is only considered
hazing if the victim is a member or potential member of a school team or the conduct was "for
the purpose of initiation, admission into, affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition of
continued membership in any organization...." Id. at (l)(b)(i). In addition, the connection
between the policy embodied in the hazing statute and the other statutes cited by Plaintiff and the
conduct in question here is far too tenuous to comport with the repeated statements of the Utah
Supreme Court emphasizing the narrowness of the public policy exception. See Hansen v. Am.
Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, P9; Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. The court concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to the claim for wrongful
termination.
IV. Amending the Complaint
The court denies Plaintiffs request to amend his complaint because the request fails to
comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules. Although Plaintiff notes that leave to amend
should be freely given where justice so requires, the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
have explained that denying a request to amend a complaint based on a failure to comply with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is well within the discretion of the trial court. Holmes
Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38; Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, P42. Indeed,
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Plaintiffs request is nearly identical to the requests made in both Holmes and Coroles, the
denials of which were upheld by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively.
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, his request to amend
the complaint is denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are
granted as to all claims. The claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and wrongful termination are dismissed without prejudice, and the claim for intentional
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs request to amend
his complaint is denied. Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an order reflecting this mling and
submit it to the court for signature.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD HUDGENS, an individual,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
PROSPER, INC., a Utah corporation and
JOSHUA CHRISTOPHERSON, an
individual,

Civil No. 080400249
Honorable Judge Stott

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on July 14, 2008 for oral argument on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff was represented by Sean N. Egan. Defendants
were represented by Evan A. Schmutz. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and
papers filed in connection with the Motion to Dismiss heard the arguments of counsel
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and took the matter under advisement. On July 23, 2008, the Court issued a written
Ruling, granting Defendants' Motion and, good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Based on the stipulation of the parties made on the record and in open

court, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the claim for intentional
interference with contractual relations because the defendants are not third parties to the
employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Prosper, Inc., and under Utah law
a claim for intentional interference can only be asserted against third parties to the
contract. Dismissal of the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is
with prejudice.
2.

The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as against the claims for assault

and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress because the remedy provided
under the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee who is
injured or killed in the course of employment. Utah Code Ann., § 34A-2-105(l) (2008).
Although Utah case law recognizes a narrow exception to the exclusive remedy of the
Workers' Compensation Act, Laniz v. Nat'I Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah
App. 1989), Plaintiff has not alleged facts in the Complaint sufficient to support a claim
that the defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure the plaintiff. Therefore,
the claims for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
dismissed without prejudice.
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3.

The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as against the claim for wrongful

termination. Under Utah law, plaintiff is presumed to be an "at-will" employee. The "atwill" presumption can be overcome under Utah law by a showing that "(1) there is an
implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or
upon satisfaction of some agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the
right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the
termination of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public
policy." Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2006 UT 71 ^3. Plaintiff conceded that the first
two categories are not applicable. The public policy exception is interpreted narrowly
under Utah law. As to the public policy exception, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient
facts to make a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Therefore, the claim for wrongful termination is dismissed without prejudice.
4.

Although not made by formal motion, plaintiff requested leave to amend

the complaint. The Court denies the request for leave to amend the complaint because
plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

(

day of S^fember, 2008.
BY THE COURT:
/

/

mur

Honorable GaiyVb. Stott
Fourth DistriciC^ourt Judge
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Approved as to form and substance:

Sean N. Egan
Attorney for Plaintiff
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